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THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
IN LABOR UNIONS AND THE USE OF THE
HOBBS ACT TO COMBAT ORGANIZED CRIME
I. Introduction
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA)' guarantees specific membership rights to more than
twenty million2 labor union members in the United States. While
each union's individual constitution affords its members specific
rights,3 the LMRDA, through its Bill of Rights,4 provides for equal
protection5 and freedom of speech and assembly,6 and ensures demo-
cratic participation by all union members. Moreover, the LMRDA
imposes minimum standards on union officials regarding disclosure of
1. 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1982).
2. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS at 401 (108th ed. 1988).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 43 1(a) requires that "every labor organization shall adopt a constitu-
tion and bylaws," and the section enumerates specific items the constitution must include.
While the LMRDA's Bill of Rights contains a proviso subjecting it to "reasonable rules
and regulations in such institution's constitutions and bylaws," the proviso does not have
the effect of validating a requirement which is inconsistent with the LMRDA's Bill of
Rights. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1982). See Wittstein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 326
F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379 U.S. 171 (1964); see generally Summers, Pre-emp-
tion and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 119, 143-44
(1961) ("Under the [LMRDA], certain federal rights are dependent on provisions in the
union's constitution .... The union constitution, however, is... a vague, incomplete and
ambiguous document requiring judicial interpretation").
4. 29 U.S.C. § 411; see infra notes 5-6 and 42-65 and accompanying text.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(1) provides a guarantee of equal rights:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referen-
dums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to partici-
pate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject
to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and
bylaws.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) ensures union members' rights to freedom of speech and
assembly:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assem-
ble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opin-
ions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon
candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business prop-
erly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable
rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall
be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce
reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organiza-
tion as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere
with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
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information, the imposition of trusteeships, the fiduciary duty owed to
union members, and procedures for fair elections.'
Despite the threat of penalties, and the availability of civil proceed-
ings by union members against union officials who fail to comply with
the LMRDA's provisions,' labor racketeering and corruption9 have
continued ° primarily because of the influence of organized crime over
some labor unions." In 1986, the President's Commission on Organ-
7. See infra notes 66-96 and accompanying text. In addition, under the National
Labor Relations Act, employees are granted the right to bargain collectively, and free-
dom from unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1970). See Katz & Freedman,
Members' Control Over Officers, Elections, and Finances: Equitable Remedies and Modern
Developments, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 97, 106 (1961). "[T]he Taft-Hartley Act [NLRA] essen-
tially creates and protects rights which are based upon employment relationships and
collective bargaining and not upon internal incidents of union membership."
8. Each section of the LMRDA contains provisions for redressing violations of the
LMRDA. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 412 (providing that any person may bring an action for
violations of the Bill of Rights). See also § 439 (violations of the reporting requirements);
§ 461(c) (violations of trusteeship provisions). For any one of these violations, there may
be a fine of not more $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. See
also § 501(c) (violations of fiduciary obligations); § 504(b) (prohibitions against certain
persons holding office). For a violation of these provisions, there may be a fine of $10,000
or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. See also § 530 (deprivation of
rights by violence-$1,000 fine or one year imprisonment or both). See also infra notes
171-73 and accompanying text.
9. Corruption in this context has been defined as "the use of union power for private,
unsanctioned enrichment by anyone." Hutchinson, The Anatomy of Corruption in Trade
Unions, 8 INDUS. REL. 135 (1969). Labor racketeering is defined as "the infiltration,
domination, and use of a union for personal benefit by illegal, violent, and fraudulent
means." ORGANIZED CRIME COMMISSION REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATrOR-
NEY GENERAL, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS AND LABOR UNIONS at 9
(March 1986) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT I]; see also Blakey &
Goldstock, "On the Waterfront" RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AMER. CRIM. L.
REV. 341 (1980) [hereinafter Blakey & Goldstock] ("labor racketeering [is] the use of
union power for personal benefit").
10. See generally, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 9, at 89. The
Commission found that "through the legitimacy conferred by infiltration of the business
community and the labor movement, organized crime has multiplied its power a hundred
fold by gaining access to the institutions of society in an overt way." Id. at xv. See also
United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984),
aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. 'denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). To emphasize the
increasing problem of corruption in the unions, Judge Ackerman quoted David Du-
binsky, former President of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union:
"[r]acketeering is the cancer that almost destroyed the American trade-union move-
ment." 581 F. Supp. at 283 (citing D. DUBINKSY & A. ROSKIN, A LIFE WITH LABOR
(1977)). Moreover, discussing the specific role of the Provenzano Group in infiltrating
Teamsters Local 560, Judge Ackerman found that "[m]urder and other forms of intimi-
dation [were] utilized to insure silence. To get along, one had to go along, or else." 581
F. Supp. at 282.
11. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has found that the so-called "Big Four" un-
ions are "substantially influenced and/or controlled by organized crime": the Interna-
tional Longshoreman's Association; the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
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ized Crime disclosed that, out of 70,000 labor organizations, over 400
are associated with, or were influenced or controlled by organized
crime.' 2 In addition to having a pervasive economic impact on the
free market system,'3 union leaders influenced by organized crime
have systematically deprived union members of their LMRDA rights
by creating a "climate of intimidation"' 4 in which members have for-
saken' 5 the exercise of their rights.' 6 These union officials, in turn,
personally benefit from their relationship with organized criminal
enterprises. '
7
International Union; the International Brotherhood of Teamsters; and the Laborers In-
ternational Union of North America. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 9,
at xvi. The President's Commission explained that "although labor racketeering can be
conducted by anyone, the history of the labor movement shows that the most substantial
corruption in the unions is conducted by organized crime families and syndicates." Id. at
9.
12. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 9, at 2 n.2. While the Com-
mission pointed out that this number is in fact quite small compared to the 70,000 labor
organizations in existence in the United States, the report explained that many of the
unions infiltrated by organized crime are "major locals embracing thousands of members,
and they operate in strategic commercial sectors and large urban and metropolitan cen-
ters." Id.
13. The President's Commission on Organized Crime uncovered several ways in
which businesses can be influenced by organized crime. Some businesses, the Commis-
sion reported, are owned or controlled by organized crime. These businesses "provide a
legitimate front for criminal activities and can enable organized crime to eliminate com-
petition and set prices in particular markets." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT I,
supra note 9, at 10-11. Other businesses are enticed into dealing with unions and busi-
nesses influenced by organized crime with the reward of reduced labor costs, labor peace,
or higher profits. Id. And through more traditional methods of corruption, "some busi-
nesses have truly been victims of organized crime, making payoffs or providing other
services in response to extortionate demands or risking exclusion from certain markets."
Id.
14. Local 560, 581 F. Supp. 279, 284-85 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
15. See, e.g., id. at 284. The Government alleged that corruption caused members of
Local 560 to "consent to the surrender of certain valuable property in the form of their
union rights .... Id.
16. In addition to the finding of extensive corruption in the Teamsters union in Local
560, the McClellan Committee in the 1950s (see infra note 32) uncovered corruption and
racketeering in the Butchers, Bakers, Distillery Workers, Operating Engineers,
Carpenters, Textile Workers, and Hotel and Restaurant Employees Unions. Hutchinson,
The Anatomy of Corruption in Trade Unions, 8 INDUS. REL. 135, 136 (1969). Moreover,
in 1978 "Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti estimated that 300 union locals 'are se-
verely influenced by racketeers.' " Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 9, at 342.
17. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 9, at 9. The stud-
ies of the Big Four unions illustrate how union officials under the influence of organized
crime "routinely pay themselves and their allies excessive salaries, fees, and commissions.
They and their families can receive an array of benefits and payments, ranging from reim-
bursement for non-union related criminal defense fees to houses, cars, and chauffeurs."
Id. at 12.
Investigations into organized crime have disclosed that the most influential crime
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In recent years the Government has used the federal extortion stat-
ute (the Hobbs Act)'" in its attempt to rid unions of the corrupting
influence of organized crime, and has alleged that La Cosa Nostra19
and other organized crime groups have, through the use of extor-
tion, z° forced union members to forsake their rights guaranteed under
the LMRDA. The Government's first such case succeeded in United
States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.2 , One
issue addressed by the court in that case is whether intangible prop-
erty in the form of membership rights in labor unions are property
rights within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. 2 A similar question has
developed in cases prosecuted under the mail23 and wire fraud 4 stat-
group in this country is the Commission of La Cosa Nostra ("This Thing of Ours"). The
existence of La Cosa Nostra was made public in the early 1960s through the testimony of
a former mafia "soldier" to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. ORGANIZED
CRIME COMMISSION REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE IM-
PACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY at 45 (April 1986) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION REPORT II]. The President's Commission reported in 1986 that "no other crime
group . . . is so formally organized, so broadly established, or so effective." While La
Cosa Nostra's criminal activities include several crimes such as gambling, kidnapping
and arson, La Cosa Nostra's primary activity in the North East is labor racketeering and
infiltration of the construction trades. Id.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982) [hereinafter the Hobbs Act]. Extortion under the Hobbs
Act is defined as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right." 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(b)(2). Thus, a person can be found guilty of extortion under the
Hobbs Act either as a result of the wrongful use of force, violence or fear, or, in the
alternative, if he acted "under color of official right." Id. "Extortion 'under color of
official right' is committed when a public official makes wrongul use of his office to obtain
money not due him or his office." United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 130 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). Under this theory of extortion, "the wrongful
use of official power need not be accompanied by actual or threatened force, violence or
fear." Id. at 131. However, under both theories of extortion under the Hobbs Act, a
wrongful taking of property is required. This Note will address primarily those Hobbs
Act cases in which property-union members' rights to democratic participation in un-
ions-was wrongfully taken through the use of force, violence or fear.
19. See supra note 17.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982).
21. 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1140 (1986). The Government brought this case under RICO, and alleged that
union officials extorted union members into relinquishing their democratic rights guaran-
teed under the LMRDA. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 114-34 and accompanying text.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982); see also United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 37 (2d Cir.
1988); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (mail and wire fraud have
the same language in relevant part and courts apply the same standard of review); see
infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text. See also Note, The Federal Mail Fraud Stat-
ute After McNally v. United States, 107S. Ct. 2875: The Remains of the Intangible Rights
Doctrine and its Proposed Congressional Restoration, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743 (1988).
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utes.25 In those cases, courts originally held that the requirement of
fraud or injury relating to property under the mail and wire fraud
statutes only applied to tangible, economic property interests. 26 Re-
cently, however, the legislature has extended the coverage of the mail
and wire fraud statutes to fraud involving certain intangible rights. 2"
A second challenge to the use of the Hobbs Act as a prosecutorial
tool against the extortion of union members, rights has arisen where
Hobbs Act allegations form the basis of suits brought by the Govern-
ment under the civil remedies28 provision of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 29 RICO has become a pow-
25. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd,
483 U.S. 350 (1987); United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909 (1974).
26. The mail fraud statute was amended in response to the Supreme Court's decision
in McNally, and thus courts now consistently hold that the mail fraud statute does pro-
tect certain intangible rights. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 26.
28. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. While RICO authorizes the Govern-
ment to bring both criminal prosecutions and civil proceedings, the Government has in-
creasingly brought suit under the civil remedies provision of RICO because the section
gives the court great "discretionary power to make use of a wide range of civil remedies."
United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile, & Composition Roofers, Damp & Water-
proof Workers Assn., 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.
1989).
29. See, e.g., United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 345
(S.D.N.Y., filed June 26, 1988); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581
F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1140 (1986); United States v. Local 30, Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp &
Waterproof Workers Ass'n, 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). See also United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978); United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 993 (1983) (Hobbs Act convictions based on extortion of union property).
In addition, the Government recently entered into an agreement with the General Ex-
ecutive Board of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in settlement of the Gov-
ernment's complaint alleging that the Commission of La Cosa Nostra had seized control
of the Teamsters and used the union as an enterprise for corruption. United States v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 26, 1988). In its
complaint, the Government alleged similar charges to those discussed in Local 560, in-
cluding the extortion of union members' rights under the Hobbs Act, and expenditure by
the General Executive Board of union assets for illegal means. The three main charges in
the Government's complaint which constituted a pattern of racketeering activity were:
(1) wire fraud in connection with the election of Roy L. Williams and Jackie Presser in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982, (2) extortion of the union membership in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982); and (3) mail fraud in connection with the Teamsters' official
journal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Complaint at T 56-80, United States v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 26, 1988). The
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erful tool used in combatting corruption in labor unions.30 Congress
enacted RICO in 19703" as a weapon to "halt organized crime's incur-
sion into legitimate organizations."32 A successful civil RICO claim
requires proof that a person affects interstate commerce through a
pattern of racketeering activity. 3 The statute further defines "a pat-
tern" as the commission of at least two acts of racketeering,34 and
specifically enumerates the predicate acts which constitute racketeer-
ing activity,35 including "any act which is indictable under [the Hobbs
Act] (actions relating to interference" with commerce, robbery, or ex-
tortion)."36 Moreover, several labor-related crimes are specifically in-
cluded in RICO's list of predicate acts.37
Complaint specifically alleged that members of the Teamster's General Executive Board
extorted members' rights through numerous murders, shootings and beatings; the ap-
pointment of criminals to union office; associations with criminals; and the failure to
redress demonstrated instances of corruption. (Complaint at 73). Under the settlement,
the Teamsters officials named as the defendants in the Government's complaint are "per-
manently enjoined from committing any acts of racketeering activity ... and from know-
ingly associating with any member or associate of . . . any .. . [o]rganized [cirime
[fnamilies of La Cosa Nostra or any other criminal group, or any other person otherwise
enjoined from participating in union affairs." No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y. March 14,
1989) (order). The settlement provides for three court-appointed officers with discipli-
nary and review authority to oversee the Teamsters' operations, including authority to
impose trusteeships on local unions and review over all action which "constitutes or fur-
thers an act of racketeering .... Id. at 10. The agreement also gives the court-appointed
administrator the authority to distribute information to Teamsters members. Id. at 16.
30. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION RE-
PORT II, supra note 17, at 47 (prosecutions and their effect).
31. Enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
32. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 9, at 348. See also United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 591 (1981). ("major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legiti-
mate business by organized crime").
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982): " '[P]attern of racketeering activity' requires at least
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of which occurred within [10] years (excluding any period of impris-
onment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
34. Id. See infra note 156.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
As used in this chapter-(1) 'racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under [s]tate
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which
is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States
Code .... "
This list includes, but is not limited to, extortion, bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1982), supra note 35.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(C) includes as predicate acts any act which is indictable
under: 29 U.S.C. § 186 (illegal labor payoffs); 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (embezzlement of union
funds). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), which includes 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (employee ben-
efit plan kickbacks) and 18 U.S.C. § 664 (embezzlement of pension and welfare funds) as
HOBBS ACT
This Note examines the use of the Hobbs Act to preserve democ-
racy in labor unions. Part II discusses the LMRDA and the impor-
tance of membership rights to the fair and democratic management of
labor unions. Part III examines the requirements for prosecution
under the Hobbs Act and illustrates that the rights incident to full
democratic participation in the affairs of unions are property rights
that qualify as the kind of property which can be wrongfully taken
under the Hobbs Act. Part IV discusses the RICO cause of action
where a Hobbs Act violation serves as a predicate act, and RICO's
legislative history with regard to its use as a weapon to combat cor-
ruption in labor unions, and concludes that the RICO cause of action
predicated in part on labor-related crimes is appropriate where the
democratic rights of union members have been extorted. Finally, this
Note concludes that the Hobbs Act should be interpreted, as the mail
fraud statute has, to protect intangible rights, sending a clear signal
that union officials and corrupt organizations will be prosecuted
under the Hobbs Act when union members' rights are extorted.
II. Democratic Rights Under The LMRDA
The LMRDA was passed in 1959 in response to congressional in-
vestigations, led by Senator John McClellan, into the growing prob-
lem of racketeering and corruption within the nation's labor unions."
predicate acts. See Brief for Plaintiff at 26, United States v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 26, 1988).
38. SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR AND MANAGEMENT
FIELD, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2318 (the Chairman of the Committee was Senator John McClellan of
Arkansas) [hereinafter the McClellan Committee]. See R. BELLACE AND A.
BERKOWITZ, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT: TWENTY YEARS OF FEDERAL PROTEC-
TION FOR UNION MEMBERS' RIGHTS (Labor Relations and Public Policy Series, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, Industrial Research Unit, vol. 19 (1979)) [hereinafter BELLACE &
BERKOWITZ]; see also Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851 (extensive discussion of LMRDA legislative history) [here-
inafter Aaron]. The McClellan Committee published two interim reports, one in 1958
and one in 1959, and a final report in 1960 after the LMRDA was passed. Although the
investigations of the Committee were aimed at corruption throughout the nation's un-
ions, the Teamsters union emerged as the union most riddled with corruption. BELLACE
& BERKOWITZ, supra, at 3. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) contains a statement of findings,
purposes and policy of the LMRDA:
(b) The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and
management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of
trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other fail-
ures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which re-
quire further and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection
of the rights and interests of employees and the public generally as they relate to
the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and
their officers and representatives.
1989]
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Indeed, the LMRDA incorporated several specific recommendations
which emerged from these investigations.39
The McClellan Committee's first interim report4° stressed the need
for federal regulations to ensure the efficient and honest representa-
tion to which each union member is entitled. Through democratic
participation and the public disclosure to members of the unions' fi-
nancial matters, the drafters of the LMRDA sought to ensure that
union officials would be accountable to the members, thus protecting
individual members from corrupt leadership. 4' The LMRDA ad-
dresses various forms of corruption uncovered by the McClellan
Committee; an analysis of the abuses that prompted the legislation
illustrates the lack of democratic participation which results when
union members are unable to exercise their rights now guaranteed by
the LMRDA.
A. The Bill of Rights of Union Members
Title I of the LMRDA42 contains the Bill of Rights of union mem-
bers, and its purpose is clear: to guarantee equal rights,43 freedom of
speech and assembly, 44 to regulate dues, initiation fees, and assess-
ments,45 to protect union members' right to sue,46 and to provide safe-
Id.
39. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2318. In its First Interim Report, the McClellan Committee recom-
mended that legislation be enacted "l) [t]o regulate and control union funds; 2) to insure
union democracy; 3) to curb activities of middlemen in labor management disputes; and
4) to clarify the 'no-man's land' between state and federal authority." Id.
40. Id.
41. See McNamara v. Johnston, 360 F. Supp. 517, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 522
F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) ("in enacting this legislation
[Congress intended] to weed out instances of corruption and breach of trust [and] to
preserve rights of individual union members"); Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 295
(D. Minn. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963) ("Congress wished to stop the outra-
geous conduct of thugs and gangsters and also wished to stop lesser forms of objectiona-
ble conduct by those in positions of trust").
42. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text; see infra notes 43-65 and accompany-
ing text.
43. See supra note 5.
44. See supra note 6.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(3) (1982) (provisions for increasing dues and initiation fees by
majority vote).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(4) provides in pertinent part:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an
action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irre-
spective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as
defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any
member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, adminis-
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guards against improper disciplinary action against union members.47
Through their investigations, the McClellan Committee found that
there existed "a significant lack of democratic procedures in [the] un-
ions studied,"48 and recommended that procedures be enacted to reg-
ulate elections and safeguard the rights of members.49 The resulting
Bill of Rights was designed specifically for that purpose.5"
The legislative history of Title I indicates that Senator McClellan
envisioned a free speech provision in the LMRDA's Bill of Rights
which would equal the protection of free speech guaranteed by the
first amendment to the United States Constitution."' Senator McClel-
lan emphasized that equal rights52 guaranteed to union members
should mirror the "basic human rights on which our very freedom
was founded."' 53 Rather than word the section as a wide-open guar-
antee of basic human rights, however, the final version of the section
enumerated the specific rights which would be protected.54 Further-
more, these rights are "subject to reasonable rules and regulations in
such organization's constitution and bylaws."55
In several cases courts have found that infringements on the equal
protection and free speech guarantees of the Bill of Rights have
forced 6 members to relinquish their rights guaranteed under the
trative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communi-
cate with any legislator.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1982).
48. Aaron, supra note 38, at 856-57.
49. See supra note 39.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982); see, e.g., Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435-36
(1982) (emphasis of § 411 of the LMRDA is "on the rights of union members to freedom
of expression without fear of sanctions by the union, which in many instances could mean
loss of union membership and in turn loss of livelihood").
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See 105 CONG. REC. 5810-11 (1959), reprinted in II LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT
at 1102 (1959) [hereinafter II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Democracy in unions has been
compared to democracy in government: "only in a democratic union can workers,
through chosen representatives, participate jointly with management in the government
of their industrial lives even as all of us may participate, through elected representatives,
in political government." Cox, Internal Affairs of Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of
1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 830 (1960).
52. See supra note 5.
53. 105 CONG. REC. 5811 (1959), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
51, at 1103; see also Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. at 435 (LMRDA's Bill of Rights was
"aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaran-
teed by the [flederal Constitution ...").
54. See supra notes 4-6. Moreover, the resulting free speech provision gave unions
specific grounds on which they could discipline members' speech. Semancik v. United
Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 1972).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(1) (1982); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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LMRDA.57 These cases demonstrate that when members give up
their Title I rights,58 the remaining provisions of the LMRDA, such
as election safeguards, reporting requirements, and fiduciary obliga-
tions, 9 fail to be enforced because members fear the consequences of
speaking out against these abuses."
In Semancik v. United Mine Workers,6' for example, the court
found that the union violated the free speech guarantee of the
LMRDA's Bill of Rights by disciplining union members whenever
they discussed the fitness of union leaders. Under the circumstances
of the broad disciplinary rules established by the Mine Workers offi-
cials, the court found that "a reasonable man might well refrain from
taking full advantage of his rights."62 Similarly, in Hall v. Cole,63 the
Supreme Court stressed that "[w]hen a union member is disciplined
for the exercise of any of the rights protected by Title I, the rights of
all members of the union are threatened." 6 Moreover, the Hall
Court found that "by vindicating his own right, the successful litigant
dispels the 'chill' cast upon the rights of others. 65
B. Reporting Requirements
Title II of the LMRDA 66 guarantees the disclosure to union mem-
bers of information regarding the financial condition of the unions
57. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 109 S. Ct. 639 (1989). In
Lynn, an elected business agent was removed in retaliation for his outspoken opposition
to a dues increase sought by a union trustee appointed by the international union's presi-
dent. The Court explained that the removal of an elected official not only deprives mem-
bers of the representative of their choice, but also creates a "chilling effect" on members'
free speech rights. As the Court illustrated, "[s]eeing Lynn removed from his post just
five days after he led the fight to defeat yet another dues increase proposal, other mem-
bers of the Local may well have concluded that one challenged the union's hierarchy, if at
all, at one's peril." Id. at 645 (footnote omitted). See also Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457
U.S. 102, 109, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 899 (1982); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); Wirtz
v. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492, 497 (1968).
58. See supra notes 41-46; see infra notes 65-88 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 66-96 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Semancik v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972). In that
case, union members who opposed incumbent union officers were granted preliminary
injunctions from disciplinary action by the union. See also Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n v. Lynn, 109 S. Ct. 639, 645 (1989).
61. Semancik, 466 F.2d at 154.
62. Id.
63. 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1982). See BELLACE & BERKOWITZ, supra note 38, at 84
("Congress enacted the reporting requirements of Title II with the hope that disclosure
would act as a deterrent to improper activities").
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and its officials. 67 This section also requires that unions file with the
Secretary of Labor their constitutions and bylaws containing provi-
sions and procedures regarding membership requirements, disburse-
ment of union funds, the calling of meetings, and discipline or
removal of officers.68
When these reporting requirements are violated, the members' lack
of knowledge may result in an inability to exercise their rights of vot-
ing and free speech. The cases construing these requirements indicate
that without full disclosure, members are unaware of internal union
affairs, and as a result, are unable to make informed decisions about
important union issues.6 9
In the Local 560 case, for example, the court found that the Team-
sters executive board defendants violated the members' rights to dis-
closure, and as a result the officials extorted union members' rights
by:
(1) making certain appointments and reappointments to union of-
fices; (2) failing to remove certain appointees from office; (3) spend-
ing union assets for [the personal use of] Anthony Provenzano;
(4) permitting access to local 560's offices by known or reputed
67. 29 U.S.C. § 431(b) (1982); The McClellan Committee emphasized that the
LMRDA was:
designed to prevent, discourage, and make unprofitable improper conduct on
the part of union officials, employers, and their representatives by requiring re-
porting of arrangements, actions, and interests which are questionable ....
[O]nly full disclosure will enable the persons whose rights are affected ... to
determine whether the arrangements or activities are justifiable, ethical, and
legal.
SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR AND MANAGEMENT FIELD,
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2318, 2321.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 431(a)(5) (1982). Moreover, Title II requires that unions make this
information available to all members.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279,
316 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267, 283 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140
(1986); see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
Edwin H. Stier, court-appointed trustee of Local 560, commented recently: "[i]n the
Provenzano days ... this union hall was always full of hard-core Mafia thugs-extortion-
ists, thieves, murderers. No one dared to raise his voice in the face of scandal and victim-
ization, so great was the sense of powerlessness." N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, § 4 (Week
In Review), at 6, col. 3. Through the successful RICO action against Local 560, and the
appointment of a trustee to ensure fair elections and full disclosure, Mr. Stier predicted
"a beginning toward creating a truly democratic atmosphere in which members know
that they have rights which do not derive directly from those in power, in which they
exercise free speech and where ... they will hold the people elected accountable if they do
not provide good leadership." Id. Recently, however, the Local 560 election was held and
Michael Sciarra, an associate of Anthony Provenzano was elected. In reaction to the
election, Local 560's trustee observed that "the local, if not willing to change its leader-
ship, was at least changing its ways." N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1988, at B12, col. 1.
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criminals; and (5) being recklessly indifferent to the above-men-
tioned systematic misconduct of fellow incumbent officers.7°
The district court emphasized in Local 560 that "the true test of
union democracy is whether the members feel free to openly criticize
the policies and practices of the incumbents, and not merely whether
there [is] any opposition to candidates."'7 1
C. Trusteeships
In their original form, trusteeships72 were imposed by parent un-
ions to remedy corruption by union officials at the local level. How-
ever, the McClellan Committee's investigations revealed that
trusteeships were no longer being used as a remedy for corruption,
but rather as an instrument for further corruption. 73 The McClellan
Committee discovered that national or international (parent) unions74
had imposed trusteeships on local (subordinate) unions75 without le-
gitimate reasons, and in several instances had kept the subordinate
groups under trusteeship for unnecessarily long periods. For exam-
ple, when the LMRDA was passed, seventeen United Mineworkers'
districts had been in trusteeship for more than twenty years, and four
districts had been in trusteeship for more than ten years.76
70. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 283 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). Anothony Provenzano, the leader of the
"Provenzano Crime Group," served Local 560 in various official capacities from 1948 to
1978. See Local 560, 581 F. Supp. 279, 289, for a discussion of Provenzano's criminal
history and his relationship with the Teamsters union.
71. 581 F. Supp. 279, 316 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 402(h) defines a trusteeship as "any receivership, trusteeship, or other
method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy
otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws."
73. The House Committee on the LMRDA reported that "the hearings of the Mc-
Clellan Committee demonstrate that in some instances trusteeships have been used as a
means of consolidating the power of corrupt union officers, plundering and dissipating
the resources of local unions, and preventing the growth of competing political elements
within the organization." H. R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1959), reprinted
in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2424, 2435.
74. See infra note 75.
75. A subordinate body is a labor organization that is subject to the jurisdiction of a
higher (parent) labor organization. M. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE
UNION 179 (1988).
76. See Note, Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio, 71 YALE L.J. 1460,
1488-89 (1962). See generally, D. McLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUM-
GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION DEMOCRACY at 127 (1979). Five major abuses of the trustee-
ship remedy were found by the McClellan Committee:
1. Some parent bodies imposed trusteeships without legitimate basis for doing
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Title III" of the LMRDA was designed to prevent such abuse of
the trusteeship remedy. The title both guarantees that trusteeships
will be imposed to prevent the arbitrary use of trusteeships on local
unions, and sets forth standards for trusteeships once they are
imposed.
Where alleged undemocratic processes violate the LMRDA, such
as violations of election processes,79 the imposition of trusteeships is
proper and effective.8s Moreover, the imposition of a trusteeship that
meets the requirements of Title III can be a valuable method of re-
2. Some parent organizations ... kept their subordinate body under trustee-
ship for too long a time....
3. The imposition and continuation of such trusteeships often went against the
wishes of the rank and file members.
4. Trusteeships were at times used by the parent body as a means of looting
local treasuries.
5. Some parent body officials used the votes of convention delegates from lo-
cals under trusteeship either to capture top officials or to perpetuate themselves
in office once elected.
Id. at 127.
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1982).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 462 provides:
Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor organization over
a subordinate body only in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the
organization which has assumed trusteeships over the subordinate body and for
the purpose of correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the per-
formance of collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a bargaining
representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the
legitimate objectives of such labor organization.
See, e.g., Jolly v. Gorman, 428 F.2d 960, 967 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023
(197 1) (section ensures that a union cannot arbitrarily or capriciously impose its will on a
subordinate body or establish a trusteeship for insidious purposes).
79. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
80. See United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp
& Waterproof Workers Assn., 686 F. Supp. 1139,-1167 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d
401 (3d Cir. 1989). The court in Local 30 stated:
[i]n a case where financial problems are the chief source of trouble in a [u]nion,
or where entrenched incompetence in leadership temporarily undermines the
rights of the membership, a trusteeship may be the best choice. That is not the
case here, where the court is confronted by a [u]nion that has existed for many
years as a criminal-dominated organization.
686 F. Supp. at 1167. See also C.A.P.E. Local Union 1983 v. International Bhd. of Paint-
ers, 598 F. Supp. 1056 (D.N.J. 1984) (election was held without sufficient information
distributed to members); Tam v. Rutledge, 475 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1979) (local union
violated Title VI); Hodgson v. Local 50, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2687, 2688 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (local union refused to obey order of
international to rerun election in which irregularities had occurred); Sawyers v. Grand
Lodge, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 279 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (irregularities in
conducting local meetings). See Note, Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio,
71 YALE L.J. 1460, 1468 (1962). Cf Local 13410, United Mine Workers v. United Mine
Workers, 475 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (enjoining trusteeship where local's action in
removing supervisors and denying them a vote was required by the NLRA).
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storing democracy to a union. While members of local unions have
several other options to remedy dissatisfaction with the parent body,8
in order to use these mechanisms, members' Bill of Rights and elec-
tion procedures must be enforced so that the members can express
their dissatisfaction and seek relief through the enforcement provi-
sions of the LMRDA. 82
D. Fiduciary Responsibility Requirements
Title V of the LMRDA imposes a fiduciary responsibility on a
union's officers and employees to its members.83 The title specifically
provides that the duty of a union officer is "to hold its money solely
for the benefit of the organization ... to refrain from dealing on be-
half of an adverse party... and from holding or acquiring any pecu-
niary or personal interest which conflicts with the interest of such
organization. 84
The hearings of the McClellan Committee disclosed the pervasive
abuse of authority by union officials, finding over the course of fifteen
years that more than ten million dollars had been either misused, sto-
len, or embezzled by officials of only five unions.85 Moreover, in 1986
81. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
82. See BELLACE & BERKOWITZ, supra note 38, at 148-49 ("[i]f local members can
freely speak out on the international's policies, and elections for the international's offices
are conducted fairly, courts should refuse to make changes unattainable through the bal-
lot box").
83. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) provides:
[t]he officers, agents, shop stewards and other representative members of a labor
organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its
members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person ... to hold
its money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its mem-
bers ... to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party...
in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any
pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of such organi-
zation ....
See also United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1022 (1983) ("[t]here is little doubt that union officials owe union members a fiduciary
duty."); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S.2d 345, 350 (Sup. Ct. Ulster Co. 1941) (union officers
are agents who owe fiduciary obligations to their principals); Tinkler v. Powell, 23 Wyo.
352, 151 P. 1097 (1915) (same).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). See United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile &
Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Assn., 686 F. Supp. 1139, 1166
(E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1989) ("use of [u]nion funds to pay for bail
bonds, criminal defense and related costs incurred in criminal cases against [u]nion offi-
cials is a breach of the [u]nion officers' fiduciary responsibilities ... and constitutes illegal
disbursements"). See also Morrissey v. Segal, 526 F.2d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 1975). It is a
violation of the fiduciary duties provision of the LMRDA to spend union funds for the
personal defense of union officers accused of wrongdoing "prior to a full determination on
the merits."
85. See BELLACE & BERKOWITZ, supra note 38, at 283. The five unions studied were
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the President's Commission on Organized Crime reported numerous
instances of financial abuse resulting from organized crime's influence
over union officials.8 6
While a large part of the officers' fiduciary duty involves the union's
finances, this duty extends beyond financial matters87 to include the
members' rights of democracy and due process.18 Union officials can
effectively preserve these rights by adhering to their obligation of pro-
viding union members with the information necessary to make in-
formed decisions about union issues.89
E. Election Safeguards
While all the guarantees of the LMRDA contribute in some way to
ensuring fairness and democratic participation in elections, specific
regulations involving the conduct of elections are enumerated in Title
IV. 9°
One significant way in which the election process is abused is
through the financial9' and physical coercion of members. In the face
of such coercion, or threat of coercion, union members may either
the Teamsters, the Bakery and Confectionery Workers, the Operating Engineers, the
United Textile Workers, and the Allied Industrial Workers. Id.
86. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
87. See United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 930-31 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[section 501(a)]
imposes fiduciary responsibility in its broadest sense, and is not confined to financial deal-
ings by union officials"); Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1250-52 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972). See also BELLACE & BERKOWITZ, supra note 38, at 240
n.10 ("majority of the courts that have considered it have concluded that the officer's
duty is not limited to financial dealings").
88. See, e.g., Semancik v. United Mineworkers District 50, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.
1972). In that case the court emphasized the officers' duty "to insure the political rights
of all members of [the] union." Id. at 155.
89. See BELLACE & BERKOWITZ, supra note 38, at 295; see also Blanchard v. John-
son, 388 F. Supp. 208, 214 (N.D. Ohio 1975), aff'd in part, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976) ("[i]t is the duty of union leadership under § 501, as fiducia-
ries, to see that the lines of communication and dissemination of views and opinions are
kept open and working, especially as to matters on which members will be asked to
vote").
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1982). Section 481 provides for terms of office and election
procedures and includes requests for distribution of campaign literature, civil action for
enforcement, inspection of membership lists, and provides for adequate safeguards to en-
sure fair elections. Section 481(g) governs the use of dues and funds of employers for
anyone's candidacy. Section 481 (h) requires removal of officers guilty of serious miscon-
duct. See generally Marshall v. Local Union 478, Int'l Union of North Am., 461 F. Supp.
185, 188 (S.D. Fla. 1978) ("fundamental purpose of [this chapter is] to protect the rank
and file from the potential of abuse by union officials"); Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391
U.S. 492, 497 (1968) (goal of the election process is "to keep union leadership responsive
to the membership").
91'. One example of the use of financial coercion to abuse the election process is illus-
trated in Schultz v. Radio Officer's Union of United Telegraph Workers, 344 F. Supp. 58
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decide not to participate in elections, or may hide their preferences.92
A striking example of the way that threatened coercion affects
union membership emerges from the Local 560 case, in which one
alleged form of coercion consisted of the threat to the union member-
ship that anyone who openly criticized the controlling Provenzano
Group9" ran the risk of physical injury.94 This allegation arose after
the disappearance of Anthony Castellito in 1961, who at the time of
his disappearance was openly supported by a group which had chal-
lenged the Provenzanos during the Local's 1960 election. The Gov-
ernment alleged, and the court found, that after Castellito's
disappearance, a perception grew among the membership that "any-
one who represented an actual or potential threat to the Provenzano
Group's dominance and control over Local 560 ran the risk of physi-
cal injury."'95 The court found, moreover, that "the nature and inten-
sity of that perception has been such that it survives to the present day
and is capable of exerting a substantial influence over the thoughts
and actions of the current members of Local 560. 196
III. Extortion of Union Members' Rights
A. The Local 560 Case
In United States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters,91 the Government brought a civil RICO action 98 against a local
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), where an incumbent union officer coerced a candidate to withdraw
from an election by threatening to rescind his pension. Id.
92. See Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81
YALE L. J. 407, 444 (1972). The author interviewed union members on the issue of
coercion, and the results were significant:
Eleven of the [31] complainant union members contacted suggested that candi-
dates were subject to threats of the loss of their jobs either when announcing
their candidacy or during the campaign. Eight of the [31] suggested that a
candidate's supporters were subject to the same harassment. Fourteen com-
plainant union members said job discrimination and other forms of intimidation
discouraged union members from being candidates themselves or actively sup-
porting candidates of their choice.
Id. at 445, n.153. In addition, these union members emphasized that physical coercion,
both real and threatened, "is the greatest single obstacle to honest elections." Id. at 448;
see also United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J.
1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); Semancik v.
United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972).
93. Local 560, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 312.
96. Id.
97. 581 F. Supp. 279, 337 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). In that case, the court granted the Government's request
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union alleging, among other charges of racketeering,99 the extortion
of the membership's right to democratic participation in violation of
the Hobbs Act."° The district court held,'' and the Third Circuit
affirmed, °2 that the rights guaranteed to union members under the
Bill of Rights of the LMRDA °3 are property rights within the mean-
ing of the Hobbs Act. 'I The court found that officers of the Team-
sters Local contributed to a climate of fear which "coerced a
substantial portion of the membership into relinquishing their
LMRDA rights..." through sophisticated and indirect physical and
economic threats.° 5 The court also found that Anthony Provenzano
and other members of the Provenzano Group had gained control of
and exploited Local 560.106 In addition to the findings of corruption
in Local 560, the Government has successfully proven in other cases
that the control of unions by organized criminal enterprises has
caused union members to relinquish their rights. 107
B. The Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act10 8 is a broadly worded statute which was enacted in
to put Local 560 into trusteeship because the Local had become controlled by the
Provenzano faction of the Genovese Crime Family.
98. See supra note 28.
99. See infra note 156. The complaint alleged that the Provenzano Group conspired,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), to violate, and actually did violate, 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(b) and (c). 780 F.2d at 283. For a discussion of the specific RICO provisions and how
they applied to this case, see infra notes 155-73 and accompanying text.
100. Local 560, 780 F.2d at 287. In addition to this suit against a Teamsters local, the
Government brought similar charges against the General Executive Board of the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters. No. 88 Civ. 345 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 26, 1988). See
supra note 29.
101. 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984).
102. 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
103. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
104. 780 F.2d at 282.
105. Id. at 283.
106. 581 F. Supp. 279, 306. Anthony Provenzano was the leader of the Provenzano
organized crime group, who, with members of the executive board of Local 560, "unlaw-
fully acquired and maintained, directly and indirectly, an interest in and control of the
Local 560 enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 283-84.
107. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local 95 LIUNA, 627 F. Supp. 176
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. Sheeran, 699 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Rastelli, 551 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 831 (1977). In these cases the Government proved that La Cosa Nostra deprived
members of the Teamsters union of jobs and benefits by bribing corrupt local union
officials.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982):
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
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1946 I° 9 with the main purpose of combatting labor racketeering." °
The extortion offense can be analyzed in terms of its three require-
ments:"' (1) the obtaining of property from another (2) induced by
actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official
right'' 2 (3) in such a manner as to affect interstate commerce.'13
1. The Property Requirement
The property requirement of the Hobbs Act has received considera-
ble attention by Congress and the courts," 4 because the language of
the Hobbs Act makes no distinction between intangible and tangible
property.I 5 The prevailing view of the property requirement is that it
includes both tangible property rights and any intangible property in-
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in viola-
tion of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than [20] years, or both.
(b) As used in this section -
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
109. Ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (1946).
110. See United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1123 (1977) ("main purpose of Congress in enacting the Hobbs Act was to combat labor
racketeering .... "); United States v. Daly, 564 F.2d 645, 650-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 933 (1977) ("the corrupt abuse of the power of a union official in our view is
precisely the type of activity which the [Hobbs] Act was designed to embrace"); see also
Brown & Peer, The Anti-Racketeering Act: Labor and Management Weapon Against La-
bor Racketeering, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965 (1957) [hereinafter Anti-Racketeering Act].
The precursor of the Hobbs Act, the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, was narrowly
construed by the Supreme Court to exclude certain labor activities from coverage under
the statute. United States v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942); see generally United States
v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978). In response
to this decision, "Congress thereafter enacted the Hobbs Act ... in order to implement its
intentions to curb labor racketeering." United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 550 F. Supp. 511, 516 (D.N.J. 1982).
111. See United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 59 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 405 U.S.
1048 (1972). See generally, Note, The Hobbs Act and RICO. A Remedy for Greenmail?,
66 TEX. L. REV. 647 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Greenmail].
112. See supra note 18 for a discussion of extortion committed through the wrongful
use of official power.
113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), (b)(2) (1982), supra note 108.
114. See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 550 F. Supp. at 511, 518-
19 (D.N.J. 1982); see also Note, Greenmail, supra note 111; Note, Misapplication of the
Hobbs Act to Bribery, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1340 (1985); Cohen & Yellig, Efforts to Apply
the Federal Crime of Extortion to Labor Related Violence, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 499 (1981).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982); see also United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
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terest from which someone derives livelihood or wealth. 116 In addi-
tion, several state courts have characterized union membership rights
as property because denial of membership rights precludes individuals
from working.' ' 7 New York courts, moreover, have specifically held
that voting rights are a form of property in New York."'
116. See Local 560, 780 F.2d at 281; United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075-
76 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970). The Tropiano court held that the
concept of property is not limited to tangible property, but includes "any valuable right
considered as a source or element of wealth and does not depend upon a direct benefit
being conferred on the person who obtains the property." See also United States v.
Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978) (right of company to make business decisions
free from outside pressure wrongfully imposed constitutes property for purposes of the
Hobbs Act), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340
(5th Cir.) (intangible property such as business accounts and unrealized profits therefrom
are included within those rights protected by this chapter), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951
(1973); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.) (victim's rights under its
construction contract when threatened by prolonged illegal strike may be considered
property), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th
Cir.) (right to solicit business free from threatened destruction and physical harm falls
within the scope of protected property rights under the Hobbs Act), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
985 (1980); Battaglia v. United States, 383 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1967) (right to lease space
in bowling alley free from threats), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 907 (1968). See also Bianchi v.
United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955), in which the
court quoted the Webster's Dictionary definition of property: "[t]he exclusive right to
possess, enjoy, and dispose of, a thing; ownership; in a broad sense, any valuable right or
interest considered primarily as a source or element of wealth." Id. at 189 (quoting WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d. ed. 1936)).
117. See, e.g., Carroll v. Electrical Workers, IBEW, Local 269, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 147,
31 A.2d 223, 225 (1973) (stressing that union democracy is essential to prevent members
from being "deprived of their constitutional right to earn a livelihood"); Dorrington v.
Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 201, 4 A.2d 886, 890 (1939) (right to labor and earn a
living is a property right; action taken by union local which deprived plaintiff of his right
to work is violative of plaintiff's constitutional rights); see generally, M. MALIN, INDI-
VIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION at 15 (1988).
118. See Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County),
modified on other grounds, 263 A.D. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (3d Dep't 1941). The court
held that
the right to membership in a union is empty if the corresponding right to an
election guaranteed with equal solemnity in the fundamental law of the union is
denied. If a member has a 'property right' in his position on the roster.., he
has an equally enforceable property right in the election of men who will repre-
sent him in dealing with his economic security and collective bargaining where
that right exists by virtue of express contract in the language of a union
constitution.
Id. at 37, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
This holding is significant because the definition of extortion in the Hobbs Act was
modelled after the New York extortion statute. See 91 CONG. REC. 11900 (1945). Con-
gressman Hobbs stated: "there is nothing clearer than the definitions of robbery and ex-
tortion in this bill. They have been construed by the courts not once, but a thousand
times. The definitions in this bill are copied from the New York code substantially." See
also United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062
(1977). Upholding a Hobbs Act conviction, the court looked at the legislative history of
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A similar conclusion protecting intangible rights has developed in
cases brought under the mail fraud statute." 9 This conclusion was
reached, however, only after courts had struggled with the issue of
whether the statute was intended to protect the public's intangible
right to honest and faithful government. 2 '
In 1987 the Supreme Court held in McNally v. United States 121 that
the mail fraud statute does not prohibit schemes to defraud people of
their intangible right to honest and faithful government, but only to
fraud involving money or property. 122 The Court looked at the legis-
lative history of section 1341 and found it to be limited in scope to the
protection of money or property rights.123 With this decision, the Mc-
Nally court overruled previous lower court holdings which had ex-
tended the mail fraud statute to cover intangible rights as well.' 24
The mail fraud statute was recently amended, 25 however, and the
amendment was designed specifically to overrule the McNally deci-
sion, thus once again extending the mail fraud statute to protect in-
tangible rights. '26 The drafters of the amendment made it clear that
the Act and found that "the Hobbs Act definition of extortion is similar, although not
identical to,, New York law as it existed at that time." Id. See also Note, Misapplication
of the Hobbs Act to Bribery, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1340, 1347 (1985); Anti-Racketeering
Act, supra note 110, at 972; Note, Labor Law-A New Federal Anti-Racketeering Law, 35
GEO. L.J. 302, 365 (1947).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). The mail fraud statute provides that
[w]hoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises ... for the purpose of executing such
scheme or attempting to do so, places in any post office or authorized deposi-
tory for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
postal service ... shall be fined not more that $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
120. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (section 1341 is limited in
scope to the protection of money or property rights, and does not extend to the citizenry's
intangible right to good government); United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 925-26 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983) (mail fraud statute prohibits all schemes to
defraud by any mispreresentation that in some way involves use of the postal system).
121. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
122. Id.
123. The Court found that "[i]nsofar as the sparse legislative history reveals anything,
it indicates that the original impetus behind the mail fraud statute was to protect the
people from schemes to deprive them of their money or property." Id. at 356.
124. Id. at 363-64 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases in which defendants in the
private sector, including union leaders with fiduciary duties, have been found guilty of
defrauding their unions by accepting kickbacks or selling confidential information).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. 1989) provides "for the purposes of this chapter, the
term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services."
126. Senator Biden, a co-sponsor of the amendment, explained that "the new statute
provides that the deprivation of an intangible right constitutes a crime only in circum-
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the intent of the statute was to return to the law before McNally in
which the right to honest and faithful government was a protected
property right.' 27 Additionally, in several cases before the mail fraud
statute was amended, courts held that the mail fraud statute specifi-
cally protects union members' intangible property right in the honest
and faithful services of union officials. 1
28
Thus, as evidenced by the explicit intent of Congress, 129 the doc-
trine of pre-McNally cases, 130 extending the mail fraud statute's cov-
erage to the intangible property rights in government, has prevailed.
Furthermore, at least one circuit court has held' that intangible
membership rights in labor unions constitute "property" within the
meaning of the Hobbs Act. 3 2 Despite the amendment to the mail
fraud statute, courts could still apply the McNally analysis to the in-
terpretation of the Hobbs Act, thus limiting that statute to the extor-
tion of tangible property. Indeed, the union defendants in United
States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters '33 argued that the
Supreme Court's decision in McNally, "while interpretive of the mail
fraud statute, [necessitates] re-evaluation of analogous Hobbs Act de-
cisions as well."' 134 To prevent such a re-evaluation, Congress should
clarify the definition of property in the Hobbs Act as it did in the
amendment to the mail fraud statute. Thus, union members' rights
stances where the defendant received or intended to receive a thing of value, or where the
defendant intended or contemplated some harm or loss to an organization to which the
duty of honest services was owed." 134 CONG. REC. S12,584 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Biden).
127. Senator Biden stated that under the amendment, "it is a crime to deprive any
organization-such as a corporation or a labor union-of the loyal services of its employ-
ees." Id.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 788 F.2d 234, 237 (4th Cir. 1986) ("union and its
members were not receiving what they were entitled to, that is the honest and faithful
services of their officials in the exercise of their official duties"); United States v. Boffa,
688 F.2d 919, 931 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v.
Stout, 499 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
129. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Boffa, 688 F.2d at 927; United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 411 (5th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006-07 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1358-64 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
131. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J.
1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
132. Moreover, in the recent decision Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court
commented that the "intangible nature [of property] does not make it any less 'property'
protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes." 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987).
133. No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 26, 1988).
134. Brief for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters at 38, United States v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 26, 1988).
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to democratic participation in union affairs will constitute property
within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.
2. The Threat of Fear Requirement
In addition to satisfying the property requirement, successful prose-
cution under the Hobbs Act requires that the property be obtained
through "wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,
or under color of official right."' 35  Typical cases which satisfy the
fear requirement involve a promise of economic benefit made to a vic-
tim of extortion although he has no legal claim to such benefit. 36
Courts have consistently held that the victim need only prove that he
reasonably believed the defendant possessed the power to harm him in
order to satisfy the fear element of the Hobbs Act. 37
In considering the force, violence or fear requirement, the Local
560 court found that "intimidation and fear.., caused the members
of Local 560 to surrender their LMRDA democratic rights."' 38
Moreover, the court found that this fear was evidenced by the failure
of the membership to enunciate any opposition 39 to the corrupt lead-
ership of the local."4°
The specific instances detailed in the Government's complaint illus-
trate the climate of fear created in the Local 560 case.' 4' Activities
proven by the Government included several murders of Teamsters of-
ficials and replacement of these officials with the members of the
Provenzano organized crime group despite their prior criminal con-
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209, 214 (6th Cir.) (defendant's mafia
reputation created a fear of economic loss among members of Teamsters Local 299 and
defendants violated the Hobbs Act because they "knew of and intentionally made use of
[the members'] actual fear"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983). See also Note, Greenmail,
supra note 111, at 664.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United
States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1982) (fear need not be consequence of
direct or implicit threat by defendant, but need only be reasonable under the circum-
stances), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983); see also Note, Greenmail, supra note 111, at
664 ("courts commonly define fear as 'a state of anxious concern, alarm or apprehension
of anticipated harm' ").
138. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F.Supp. 279 (D.N.J.
1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
139. The district court in Local 560 found that "if an individual fails to act when he
has an affirmative duty to do so, negative inferences concerning his intent can be drawn
from this inaction." 780 F.2d at 284.
140. Id. at 274.
141. See Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 284-85. The district court addressed each allega-
tion separately and deemed the testimony to be credible. Id. at 315.
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victions. 4 2 Convincing evidence was heard at the Local 560 trial by
an expert witness for the Government 43 who testified that "a signifi-
cant proportion of Local 560's rank and file were induced by fear of
the Provenzano Group to surrender their membership rights."''4
Thus, in actions alleging extortion of union membership rights, the
element of fear as required under the Hobbs Act1 45 is met where, as in
Local 560, it can be shown that the membership failed to protest the
corrupt activities of the union officials because of the reasonable belief
that to do so would result in retaliation by the leadership. 46
3. Effect on Interstate Commerce Requirement
The Hobbs Act also requires that there be an obstruction, delay or
other adverse affect on interstate commerce 47 as a result of the al-
leged robbery or extortion. Several courts have held that only a de
minimus effect on interstate commerce need be shown to support a
conviction under the Hobbs Act. 48 Moreover, some jurisdictions re-
142. Id. This is a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1982) (prohibitions against persons
holding office).
No person. .. who has been convicted of robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzle-
ment, grand larceny ... a violation of [the reporting or trusteeship requirements
of] this chapter, any felony involving abuse or misuse of such persor 's position
or employment in a labor organization or employee benefit plan to seek or ob-
tain an illegal gain at the expense of the members of the labor organization...
shall serve ... (2) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board
or similar governing body ... or representative in any capacity of any labor
organization.
143. 581 F. Supp. at 316. Professor Summers was a labor law specialist who testified
at the trial that "[i]t is beyond belief that 10,000 members would sit by and watch these
things done and never utter a peep." Local 560, 780 F.2d at 278.
144. 780 F.2d at 278.
145. See United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir.) (fear of wrongfully
threatened economic loss satisfies Hobbs Act), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
146. 581 F. Supp. at 334. "The wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence
or of fear of economic or physical harm in order to cause the membership of a labor
organization to surrender ... federally protected rights constitutes extortion within the
meaning of [the Hobbs Act]. See also id. at 334 and cases cited therein.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982).
148. See United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979) (to satisfy the effect
on interstate commerce requirement, "all that is required ... is proof of a reasonably
probable effect on commerce, however minimal, as [a] result of the extortion"), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980) (quoting United States v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977)). For cases requiring only a de
minimus effect on interstate commerce, see United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414, 418
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); see also United States v. Braasch, 505
F.2d 139, 147 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (quoting United States v.
De Met, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.) ("extortionate conduct having an arguably de minimus
effect on interstate commerce may nevertheless be punished"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1983)).
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quire only a "probable or potential" effect.' 49
The court in Local 560 explained that interstate commerce was af-
fected by the extortion of members' rights because the local union
entered into collective bargaining agreements with and contracted
with businesses directly engaged in interstate commerce. 1 50 Similarly,
in Rodonich v. Housewreckers Union, Local 95, the court stated that
"because the LMRDA was enacted under the auspices of the Com-
merce Clause, [where the extortion of LMRDA rights is found] the
effect on interstate commerce is clear."' 5 ' This finding by the court in
Rodonich suggests that every Hobbs Act case which implicates rights
guaranteed under the LMRDA will satisfy the requirement that there
be an effect on interstate commerce.
IV. RICO Action Predicated on Extortion
of Union Members' Rights
Membership rights in labor unions guaranteed by the LMRDA are
extortable property rights within the meaning of the Hobbs Act,'52
and thus can constitute a predicate act of a RICO claim, where the
other Hobbs Act and RICO requirements are met.'53 The use of
RICO to prosecute the extortion of union members' rights is impor-
tant, moreover, because the civil RICO remedies' 54 are necessary in
order to permanently rid the unions of the influence of organized
crime.
A. Fulfillment of RICO Requirements
A successful RICO cause of action requires that the government
prove that the defendant ("person") acquired or maintained, through
a pattern of racketeering activity, an interest in or control of an enter-
prise engaged in interstate commerce.' 55
A "pattern" of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of
149. See Note, Greenmail, supra note 111, at 663. See also United States v.
DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979); United
States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); United
States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978).
150. Local 560, 581 F. Supp. 279, 334 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1985) (Local 560 was a party to contracts with companies engaged in interstate shipment
of commodities).
151. 627 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
152. See supra notes 114-32 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 111-51, infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 161-73.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) provides (in pertinent part):
(b) [i]t shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
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racketeering' 56 -activity which is defined in the RICO statute and
which specifically includes violations of the Hobbs Act. 5 7 In the Lo-
cal 560 case, the Hobbs Act extortion of union membership rights was
one of several alleged RICO predicate acts' which satisfied the "pat-
tern of racketeering" requirement. 5 9 In addition, the Local 560 court
found that the requirements of a "person" and "enterprise" were suffi-
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) [i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities which effect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
(d) [iut shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). This section defines racketeering activity as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under [s]tate law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of
title 18, United States Code: [§] 201 (relating to bribery) ... [§] 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds) ... [§] 1341 (relating to mail
fraud), [§] 1343 (relating to wire fraud) . . . [§] 1951 (relating to interference
with commerce, robbery, or extortion), [§] 1952 (relating to racketeering)...
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, [§] 186 (deal-
ing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or [§] 501(c)
(relating to embezzlement from union funds).
The Supreme Court recently clarified the definition of a "pattern" as "at least two racke-
teering predicates that are related and that amount to, or threaten the likelihood of, con-
tinued criminal activity. Proof of neither relationship nor continuity requires a showing
that the racketeering predicates were committed in furtherance of multiple schemes."
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2895 (1989).
157. See supra note 155.
158. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 284 (D.N.J.
1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). The
Government alleged, and the court found, several predicate offenses committed by the
Provenzano Group, including specific acts of bribery, extortion, murder and conspiracy.
The district court in Local 560 enumerated the specific acts which formed the basis of the
Hobbs Act allegation:
(1) the repeated appointments of convicted criminals and persons reputed to be
involved in criminal activity to positions of trust and responsibility within Local
560; (2) the expenditure of Local 560 assets in the form of increased salary and
pension benefits to Anthony Provenzano, who has committed three criminal
offenses while a member of Local 560's executive board; (3) permitting the pres-
ence of convicted criminals and reputed criminals in the offices of Local 560;
and (4) the failure of the executive board to counter perceptions on the part of
Local 560's membership that it was unwise for the membership to voice dissat-
isfaction with executive board policy.
780 F.2d at 274.
159. The court found that the Provenzano Group had since 1950 continuously con-
ducted a pattern of racketeering activity. 581 F. Supp. at 306.
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ciently met. 16°
B. RICO Civil Remedies For Extortion of Union
Members' Rights
RICO provides a broad scope of relief to prevent and detain further
RICO violations. 161 Specifically, the provision for civil remedies. gives
the court the power, at any time, to "enter .. . restraining orders or
prohibitions, or take such other actions . . as it shall deem
proper."' 1 62 Moreover, the drafters stressed that "[t]he provisions of
this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses."' 63 Legislative history and court commentary on RICO em-
phasize that the statute "was intended to provide new weapons of
unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its eco-
nomic roots.""'6
The remedies for union corruption which are available under civil
RICO can be extremely effective. 65 The Local 560 case exemplifies
160. Id. at 303. Under § 1962(b), the court found that the Provenzano Group was a
"person" and that Local 560 was the "enterprise." Under § 1962(c), the individual de-
fendants were "persons" and the Provenzano Group represented an "enterprise." Id. at
329-30.
The RICO statute defines a person as "any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982). An enterprise "in-
cludes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id.
§ 1961(4).
161. See infra note 162.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982). § 1964(a) allows for various forms of relief:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have the jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of [§] 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders,
including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any inter-
est, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the
future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to,
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enter-
prise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision
for the rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
163. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983);
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
164. Russello, 464 U.S. at 26. The legislative history emphasizes the wide scope of
available remedies under RICO, specifically in the area of organized crime. The statute
itself states that its purpose is "to seek eradication of organized crime in the United States
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime." Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1073.
165. Congress predicted that "[t]he civil remedies of this legislation ... coupled with
its heavy criminal penalties, should enable the government to take effective action to
eliminate the serious threat posed to the safety and well-being of our democratic institu-
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the kinds of remedies available in *these cases.'66 There the court or-
dered the removal from office of the executive board and its replace-
ment with a temporary trustee "to remedy the abuses of the
Provenzano Group and the executive board, and to ensure that the
Local 560 members will be able to exercise fully their democratic
rights."'' 67 Moreover, in other RICO actions brought by the Govern-
ment, the courts have emphasized the broad scope of remedies avail-
able to unions infiltrated by corrupting influences. 168
Furthermore, the remedies available under RICO to restore democ-
racy in corrupt unions are also more effective than the more limited
sanctions available under both the Hobbs Act169 and the extortion
tions by the totalitarian dictators of organized crime's closed society." 116 CONG. REC.
S607 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1970) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
166. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J.
1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
167. Local 560, 780 F.2d at 295. Rejecting the defendants' argument that removing
the executive board and establishing a trusteeship was not within the power of the district
court, the Third Circuit, in affirming the decision, emphasized the goal of § 1964(a) and
stressed that "the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of remov-
ing the corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of innocent persons."
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4034). The Trusteeship of Local 560 was put into effect in
June 1986, and in December 1988, the local held its first election since the removal of the
Provenzano Group. One commentator noted the effect the trusteeship has had on the
local:
[e]ven if the old guard slate wins, the trusteeship has proven to be an effective
course. Not only has it brought about the first genuinely contested election in
25 years, but it enabled the first of the anti-racketeer slates to muster a turnout
of 600 at its rally. That is absolutely fantastic against the backdrop of murder,
beatings and intimidation in this local.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6, col. 4; see also supra note 69.
168. See, e.g., United States v. lanniello, 646 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 824
F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1987) (ordering the appointment of a receivership to run a restaurant
business corrupted by racketeering activity); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Local 6A, 663 F. Supp.
192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (union defendants entered into a consent judgment appointing a
trustee to oversee union operations for four years and permanently barring individual
officer defendants from holding union office or working as union laborers); United States
v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, Smoked Fish & Cannery Union, No. 87 Civ. 7351
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1988) (appointing an administrator for the Fulton Fish Market, per-
manently barring several defendants from involvement in the fish market and the union,
and enjoining racketeering activity); United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile and
Composition Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.
1989) (imposing decreeship over the roofers' union and barring officers and employees
convicted of criminal offenses from any involvement with the union). See generally Brief
for United States at 78-95, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ.
4486 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 26, 1988).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(a) provides for fines of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment
of not more than 20 years, or both.
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provision of the LMRDA. 7° When Hobbs Act cases are prosecuted
alone, and not as RICO predicate acts, the Government is limited to
the imposition of fines and prison terms against union officials con-
victed of extorting the LMRDA rights of their members. Similarly,
section 530 of the LMRDA,' v' which punishes the intimidation of
members into relinquishing their rights, does not remedy the perva-
sive corruption that the RICO remedies seek to address. As the court
in Local 560 pointed out, the Hobbs Act was explicitly designed to
remedy extortion, while section 530 of the LMRDA essentially
"make[s] assault and battery a Federal crime.., when it occurs in a
union. '  The court emphasized further that "cases which have con-
strued section 530 have all involved some form of assault and
battery."1 73
V. Conclusion
Democratic participation in a union means nothing if union officials
can intimidate members into relinquishing their rights. Because
membership rights are a source of wealth for union members, such
rights constitute property rights which can be extorted. The Hobbs
Act should be amended so that the property requirement of extortion
specifically include the intangible right to democratic participation in
a labor union guaranteed by the LMRDA in order to protect the
Government's ability to prosecute corrupt union officials under
RICO.
Leslie Marshall
170. Although this section does not mention extortion, defendants in the Local 560
case argued that § 530 of the LMRDA is an extortion statute in itself, which punishes
conduct similar to that proscribed by the Hobbs Act. Because of the similarity in the
language of the two sections, they argued that the Hobbs Act is preempted by § 530 of
the LMRDA. Local 560, 780 F.2d at 282. 29 U.S.C. § 530 provides:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person through the use of force or violence, or
threat of the use of force or violence, to restrain, coerce, or intimidate, or at-
tempt to restrain, coerce or intimidate any member of a labor organization for
the purpose of interfering with or preventing the exercise of any right to which
he is entitled under the provisions of this chapter. Any person who willfully
violates this section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both.
Id.
171. See supra note 8.
172. 780 F.2d at 282 (quoting Sen. Morse).
173. Id. at 283.
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